Author Topic: The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Recommendation for Shuttle Retirement  (Read 60699 times)

Offline QuantumG

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Yeah, I guess the years between the retirement of the shuttle and the next vehicle that maybe might fly if it isn't cancelled are just imaginary. The choice was made not to fly anything. The choice was made to leave the the risk of flying to Russia. I'm sure reality "gets old" to you, but that doesn't make it any different.



Human spaceflight is basically just LARPing now.

Offline MATTBLAK

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Yes - reality is getting old. But it's what we have to deal with and I dunno about anyone else, but I'm doing the best I can... :(
"Those who can't, Blog".   'Space Cadets' of the World - Let us UNITE!! (crickets chirping)

Offline the_other_Doug

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The incentive to move onto a new system was strong enough that STS was slated for cancellation a year later.

(there's always 1% who need it explained...)

How's the new system goin'?



Much safer than the old - so it looks like the CAIB recommendations worked well! (And not sure if you're part of the 1%, but I hope you understood ;) )

"If you can't take a little bloody nose, maybe you oughtta go back home and crawl under your bed. It's not safe out here. It's wondrous, with treasures to satiate desires both subtle and gross; but it's not for the timid."  (Q, after exposing the Federation to the Borg, "Q Who?", Star Trek - The Next Generation.)

So, I suppose the 99% could be classified as "the timid," then?  ;)

Seriously, though, saying that the CAIB never recommended the Shuttle's retirement is a little disingenuous.  The CAIB stated at something of a "requirement" level for RTF and continued flight operations past 2010 that all orbiters must be completely (and expensively) re-certified, or the system must be retired.  Granted, that's not a "you must do step a, regardless," but it is a "if you don't do step a then you must do step b" kind of requirement.  As Blackstar said, it was a strong incentive to retire STS and move on to a new vehicle -- I would imagine, the idea being to move on to a more inherently safe-to-fly vehicle.  In that context, it most certainly was a recommendation to retire STS -- and then to bring its successor online.

Too bad that Congress only "got" the first part of that, and sort of ignored the second.
-Doug  (With my shield, not yet upon it)

Offline joema

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Everything to be launched in the next few years, whether SLS-Orion, Dragon2, Soyuz, or CST-100 will be safer by far than SLS was....

I don't see it in such black and white terms. STS after 2000 was much safer than the initial flights. A Launch Escape System doesn't magically fix all problems. A failure where the crew was saved by a LES would still be a catastrophe and ground all launches for a long time,  even without loss of life.

We tend to over-weight incidents we've experienced, and under-weight those we didn't -- regardless of how dangerous they were. E.g, Apollo 13 came very close to losing the entire stack due to severe pogo during stage 2. It was by sheer luck the center engine prematurely shut down and damped the vibration, likely from the 68 g oscillating force as it bent the I-beam thrust structure three inches.

Had it not shut down, the S-II 2nd stage could have broken up, and it's unclear if the crew would have survived. By that point in the ascent, the escape tower had already been jettisoned, and abort mode 2 was the only option. The CSM could only accelerate at about 0.3 g, so an exploding or tumbling stack could easily damage the CSM before it got safely away.

Likewise the Saturn V was extremely vulnerable to an early engine failure. If any single F-1 engine failed within the first approx. 15 sec, the entire stack would fall backward onto the pad. By contrast the shuttle (after year 2000) could tolerate multiple SSME failures right off the pad.

All planned LES systems cover a small fraction of the flight envelope. They introduce weight, complexity and risk. Some Apollo astronauts breathed a sigh of relief once the LES tower was jettisoned. When the Gemini VI Titan II shut down after indicating it had launched, Wally Schirra didn't eject. This was partially because he was afraid of the ejection system.

All crewed space vehicles have a multitude of "criticality 1" items which simply must work. Whether an SRB, a parachute pyro, or the rocket-powered guillotine that cut the LM ascent stage free, there is no backup. The system is permeated with these. Picking out a couple of past obvious failures where solutions have already been applied doesn't mean the overall safety picture is greatly changed going forward.

Offline Hog

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The incentive to move onto a new system was strong enough that STS was slated for cancellation a year later.

(there's always 1% who need it explained...)

How's the new system goin'?
I understood your question, in all the flippancy it encompasses.


Everything to be launched in the next few years, whether SLS-Orion, Dragon2, Soyuz, or CST-100 will be safer by far than SLS was....

I don't see it in such black and white terms. STS after 2000 was much safer than the initial flights. A Launch Escape System doesn't magically fix all problems. A failure where the crew was saved by a LES would still be a catastrophe and ground all launches for a long time,  even without loss of life.

We tend to over-weight incidents we've experienced, and under-weight those we didn't -- regardless of how dangerous they were. E.g, Apollo 13 came very close to losing the entire stack due to severe pogo during stage 2. It was by sheer luck the center engine prematurely shut down and damped the vibration, likely from the 68 g oscillating force as it bent the I-beam thrust structure three inches.

Had it not shut down, the S-II 2nd stage could have broken up, and it's unclear if the crew would have survived. By that point in the ascent, the escape tower had already been jettisoned, and abort mode 2 was the only option. The CSM could only accelerate at about 0.3 g, so an exploding or tumbling stack could easily damage the CSM before it got safely away.

Likewise the Saturn V was extremely vulnerable to an early engine failure. If any single F-1 engine failed within the first approx. 15 sec, the entire stack would fall backward onto the pad. By contrast the shuttle (after year 2000) could tolerate multiple SSME failures right off the pad.

All planned LES systems cover a small fraction of the flight envelope. They introduce weight, complexity and risk. Some Apollo astronauts breathed a sigh of relief once the LES tower was jettisoned. When the Gemini VI Titan II shut down after indicating it had launched, Wally Schirra didn't eject. This was partially because he was afraid of the ejection system.

All crewed space vehicles have a multitude of "criticality 1" items which simply must work. Whether an SRB, a parachute pyro, or the rocket-powered guillotine that cut the LM ascent stage free, there is no backup. The system is permeated with these. Picking out a couple of past obvious failures where solutions have already been applied doesn't mean the overall safety picture is greatly changed going forward.

Not including a LES is a common critique of STS, as you point out it's small window of usage, doesnt make the system a "safe" one. 
Great post!
Paul

Offline QuantumG

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The incentive to move onto a new system was strong enough that STS was slated for cancellation a year later.

(there's always 1% who need it explained...)

How's the new system goin'?

I understood your question, in all the flippancy it encompasses.

In retrospect, perhaps you'd agree there was unintended consequences?

Human spaceflight is basically just LARPing now.

Offline Hog

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The incentive to move onto a new system was strong enough that STS was slated for cancellation a year later.

(there's always 1% who need it explained...)

How's the new system goin'?

I understood your question, in all the flippancy it encompasses.

In retrospect, perhaps you'd agree there was unintended consequences?
If you are referring to your original question, sure I can agree that there may have been some unintended consequences. (if you meant something else, you are going to have to explain further)

Paul

Offline dks13827

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"  By contrast the shuttle (after year 2000) could tolerate multiple SSME failures right off the pad. "


What is the source for a statement like that ????
« Last Edit: 01/05/2015 12:14 am by dks13827 »

Offline joema

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"  By contrast the shuttle (after year 2000) could tolerate multiple SSME failures right off the pad. "

What is the source for a statement like that ????

The previously-posted contingency abort charts showing the "three out blue" case was potentially survivable. This was further covered in astronaut Charles Precourt's presentation at the 1999 Shuttle Development Conference, plus discussions with shuttle ascent procedures specialists.

As the chart shows, this is not a clear-cut situation but updates to ET/orbiter structure, guidance, control and software were done to enable this possibility. By contrast the Saturn V required 100% reliability on all five engines for the initial ascent, else it would be like Vanguard on a stupendous scale.

Offline Hog

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"  By contrast the shuttle (after year 2000) could tolerate multiple SSME failures right off the pad. "


What is the source for a statement like that ????
Post #33.
Paul

Offline Hog

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"  By contrast the shuttle (after year 2000) could tolerate multiple SSME failures right off the pad. "

What is the source for a statement like that ????

The previously-posted contingency abort charts showing the "three out blue" case was potentially survivable. This was further covered in astronaut Charles Precourt's presentation at the 1999 Shuttle Development Conference, plus discussions with shuttle ascent procedures specialists.

As the chart shows, this is not a clear-cut situation but updates to ET/orbiter structure, guidance, control and software were done to enable this possibility. By contrast the Saturn V required 100% reliability on all five engines for the initial ascent, else it would be like Vanguard on a stupendous scale.
Weren't many of the ET/Orbiter attach improvements part of the 1988 RTF efforts? 

Pre-RTF IIRC if there was a 3 engine out(possibly 2 engine out-sure on that) there was the probability of the premature seperation of the 3 attach points with the SRB's providing all of 1st stage thrusting.
Paul

Offline joema

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Yes I think the effort began with the 1988 RTF efforts, but some improvements were deemed non-essential for RTF but OK to implement longer term. E.g, there were ongoing software improvements to contingency abort options, etc. I don't recollect exactly when the ET/orbiter attach improvements were phased in; I think in the mid-to-late 90s.

Even with these improvements there were a lot of unknowns -- it's not like these were mainstream scenarios. However the main points are: shuttle safety was undergoing continuous improvement, and alternative safety systems like launch escape, serial staging, etc. all have their own drawbacks.


Offline Wayne Hale

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Re: 3 out Blue

A lot of people think that these contingency abort procedures proved that there was a safe way out for the crew from some really severe conditions for which the shuttle was never designed.

I always thought about the Capt. Young quote about procedures like this:  "It gives the crew something to do while they are waiting to die."

Even though later ET's were improved to give the possibility of holding together structurally with two SRBs going and no SSMEs running, the probability of crew survival in this case was rather low.  I'd estimate the chances at something less than 10%. 

Human carrying rockets should have a launch escape system that works.  The shuttle did not have that capability even though we tried everything we could think of to retrofit something in.


Offline Prober

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Stupid question?

Were there 2 reports on Columbia and Challenger?   Thinking like an internal NASA & a public?

2017 - Everything Old is New Again.
"I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant..." --Isoroku Yamamoto

Offline Jim

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Stupid question?

Were there 2 reports on Columbia and Challenger?   Thinking like an internal NASA & a public?


no, one report only

Offline mtakala24

There is the crew survivability study that NASA did after CAIB. A redacted but still very interesting version is available. The report focuses much on how the orbiter broke apart, the video analysis that was done from ground-based camera footage, and on what can be learned from the high-altitude hypersonic breakup. It is available here:
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf

Offline HDTVGuy

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The Crew Survivability Report is an interesting read.    I'm 3/4 of the way through the 400 page report. 

The Crew Survivability Report pulls a number of images from the Space Shuttle Systems Handbook.   Does anyone know where I can find this handbook?

Offline MikeEndeavor23

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   I still say that we could have flown the shuttle at a reduced rate while its replacement was being put together.  From what I can tell, the shuttle could have ferried up way more supplies and so forth in 1 launch than several Space X flights.

   Understand I'm not down on SpaceX either.  I just think retiring the Shuttle before its replacement was ready was crazy to do for a host of reasons.

    Maybe its because I am still enamoured with the Shuttle. It was the most complex machine we have ever built and in some cases, it never got the due it should have gotten...

     MikeEndeavor

Online CameronD

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   I still say that we could have flown the shuttle at a reduced rate while its replacement was being put together.  From what I can tell, the shuttle could have ferried up way more supplies and so forth in 1 launch than several Space X flights.

   Understand I'm not down on SpaceX either.  I just think retiring the Shuttle before its replacement was ready was crazy to do for a host of reasons.

    Maybe its because I am still enamoured with the Shuttle. It was the most complex machine we have ever built and in some cases, it never got the due it should have gotten...

Story Musgrave (and AFAIK many others who flew) described the Shuttle system as "a butterfly strapped to a bullet".

That says it probably got more "due" than it should have... :)
 
« Last Edit: 01/13/2015 03:59 am by CameronD »
With sufficient thrust, pigs fly just fine - however, this is not necessarily a good idea. It is hard to be sure where they are
going to land, and it could be dangerous sitting under them as they fly overhead.

Offline Jim

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1.     I still say that we could have flown the shuttle at a reduced rate while its replacement was being put together.  From what I can tell, the shuttle could have ferried up way more supplies and so forth in 1 launch than several Space X flights.

2.    Understand I'm not down on SpaceX either.  I just think retiring the Shuttle before its replacement was ready was crazy to do for a host of reasons.

3.     Maybe its because I am still enamoured with the Shuttle. It was the most complex machine we have ever built and in some cases, it never got the due it should have gotten...

     MikeEndeavor

1.  A reduced rate is one of the worst things to do. 
The issue was not flying the shuttle longer but starting the replacement earlier.
The amount of cargo that Dragon and Cygnus fly per mission is meaningless, they are still cheaper and safer than the shuttle.

2.  It was more crazy flying a such a fragile vehicle.


3.  No, a nuke submarine or carrier is more complex.  And it got too much due and was over publicized .  It was flown for the sake of flying it vs flying it for specific reasons.

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