In the Shuttle’s case, the frst fight risk as now retrospectively calculated was in actuality 1 in 12 for LOC, yet at least one analysis that existed at the time of the initial launch estimated the risk to be 1 in 1,000 or better. In other words, the system was almost 100 times more dangerous than the early analysis indicated.
According to NASA program managers, the top program risk is inadequate budget; however, without an accurate NASA estimate of how much it will cost to develop and test a system, it is not possible to precisely know the program’s budgetary requirements or if there is a risk of underfunding. In this case, the difficulty is compounded by the fact that the vehicles are being developed by commercial entities, using nontraditional procurement strategies. It is not surprising that when NASA asked proposers on the second phase of the Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) Program for rough estimates of the funds needed to complete the development of a commercial crew system, it received a wide range of figures from the various companies. NASA is understandably reluctant to publicize the details of those estimates due to the proprietary nature of the figures in the ongoing competition. Nevertheless, it appears to the ASAP that the fiscal year (FY) 2012 funding level approved by Congress, which was less than half of what was requested by the Administration, will not allow commercial crew transportation to the ISS by 2016. In fact, if the new funding level continues into the future, it is the ASAP’s belief that the program is in jeopardy, thus extending the current lack of a U.S. human spaceflight capability and resulting in no alternative to reliance on Russia to obtain access to the ISS.The ASAP considers the lack of a credible and appropriately funded plan to develop a U.S. capability to launch its astronauts to the ISS to be an issue with significant safety implications. If the development program is continued without adequate funding, it will increase the likelihood that safety-related testing and modifications to correct any design deficiencies would not be made. Alternatively, terminating thedevelopment program would result in continued reliance on the Russian Soyuz, a system with an uncertain long-term future.
I wonder what the US Congress will think of the above since ASAP is clearly pointing a finger at them.
I'm very suprized this QuoteIn the Shuttle’s case, the frst fight risk as now retrospectively calculated was in actuality 1 in 12 for LOC, yet at least one analysis that existed at the time of the initial launch estimated the risk to be 1 in 1,000 or better. In other words, the system was almost 100 times more dangerous than the early analysis indicated.
Quote NASA is understandably reluctant to publicize the details of those estimates due to the proprietary nature of the figures in the ongoing competition. or the truth is finally being realized that this is not cheaper than the shuttle program.
NASA is understandably reluctant to publicize the details of those estimates due to the proprietary nature of the figures in the ongoing competition.
Quote from: Fuji on 01/26/2012 06:22 amI'm very suprized this QuoteIn the Shuttle’s case, the frst fight risk as now retrospectively calculated was in actuality 1 in 12 for LOC, yet at least one analysis that existed at the time of the initial launch estimated the risk to be 1 in 1,000 or better. In other words, the system was almost 100 times more dangerous than the early analysis indicated. If you are interested in further reading, here is a NASA presentation of the risk analysis referred to in the ASAP report:http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20110008208_2011007983.pdf